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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between ￿scal policy, ￿nancial
market frictions and business cycle ￿uctuations. It is shown that in
an economy where balance sheets play a role in the propagation of
shocks, using countercyclical ￿scal policy net worth and output ￿uc-
tuations can be reduced. After the realization of a negative shock,
countercyclical ￿scal policy reduces agency costs which would make
entrepreneurs increase investment. By this increase, ￿nancial fragility
decreases, which reduces the slowdown of economic activity.
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like to thank him for believing in me, pushing me to do the best I can and making me feel
like I am a collegue rather than a student. I will always be indebted to him.
yDepartment of Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara 06800, Turkey;
burcink@bilkent.edu.tr1 Introduction
Financial accelerator models incorporate the ￿nancial issues to the business
cycle models, which the business cycle literature have largely ignored. Ac-
cording to these models, ￿nancial frictions are the reason of the long lived
business ￿uctuations which are costly. The purpose of this paper is to propose
a stabilization policy to be undertaken by the government via ￿scal measures
so that the e￿ects of the ￿nancial frictions are reduced and ￿uctuations are
dampened. Government uses countercyclical ￿scal policy (countercyclical in
terms of transfer payments), i.e. government distributes transfer payments to
entrepreneurs in bad times and levies tax on the pro￿ts of the entrepreneurs
in good times as a policy tool. With this policy, government transfers re-
sources to the ￿nancially constrained entrepreneurs in bad times so that the
￿nancial constraints can be eased.
For the students of business cycle research, the propagation mechanism
behind the ￿uctuations is an important question. In order to understand the
propagation mechanism properly, starting with the seminal work of Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982), microfounded business cycle models have been
constructed. Eventhough these early attempts were seen as important steps
towards understanding the long lived responses of main macroeconomic vari-
ables to shocks, it was shown by Cogley and Nason (1993, 1995) that the
canonical real business cycle models could not replicate the hump-shaped
behavior of the time series data due to the lack of an internal propagation
mechanism.
The poor performance of the real business cycle models against the time
1series data made economists search for the models that could explain and
replicate the long lived responses of the economy to exogenous shocks. In-
vestigating the role of ￿nancial market frictions in the business cycle propaga-
tion is the o￿spring of this search. These models incorporated the endogenous
propagation mechanism through a credit market, so that they could repli-
cate the persistent movements in the data. Broadly, these models show that
the balance sheet conditions of the entrepreneurs are an important source
of the propagation of shocks due to the agency costs arising from the ￿nan-
cial market imperfections. This class of models is called ￿nancial accelerator
models.
A seminal contribution to this line of research was made by Bernanke
and Gertler (1989). This study developed a simple neoclassical model of
business cycle where the balance sheet of the entrepreneurs ampli￿es the
upturn in good times and worsens the downturn in bad times. Following this
study, Bernanke and Gertler (1990) showed that high agency costs decrease
the amount and the e￿ciency of the investment and this leads to ￿nancial
fragility. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) constructed a general equilibrium
model with ￿nancial market frictions and showed that ￿nancial accelerator
models can replicate the long lived responses observed in the time series.
The persistent ￿uctuations generated by these models not only describe
the world we live in, they also imply welfare costs for the consumers due to
the ￿uctuations in the consumption. Otrok (2001) shows that the welfare cost
of business cycles can be as high as 40% of total consumption. Imrohoro￿ glu
(2008) points out that the economies with high consumption volatility have
higher welfare losses. Since the ￿uctuations in ￿nancial accelerator mod-
2els are highly persistent and ampli￿ed, one can expect the welfare costs of
business cycles to be high for this particular class of models.
The undesirability of the business cycle ￿uctuations due to the welfare
costs strenghtens the need for a stabilization policy in order to dampen the
￿uctuations. If ￿nancial accelerator models can describe the world correctly,
the stabilization policy should take those into account. Then the goal of the
stabilization policy should be to reduce the e￿ects of the frictions so that the
￿uctuations will be less persistent and dampened.
The results show that a simple ￿scal rule can smooth the ￿uctuations in
entrepreneurs net worth and lessen the output volatility, while respecting the
government budget constraint. The government borrows from households in
response to a negative shock, gives a transfer payment to entrepreneurs, who
are taxed in the next period enough to ful￿ll the repayment obligation inclu-
sive of the riskless interest rate. This turns out to be a boost for entrepreneurs
because they e￿ectively get to borrow at the riskless rate via government at
bad economic times, whereas they would have to pay a high external ￿nance
premium to borrow directly. This interest rate subsidy increases investment
and leads to a faster recovery of investors net worth despite the subsequent
tax burden.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives the details of the model,
section 3 gives the impulse responses and we conclude in section 4.
32 The Model
The model utilized in this paper is a standard cashless ￿nancial accelerator
model following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998, 2001) with the inclusion of
taxation. This is a general equilibrium model which includes entrepreneurs,
households, government, consumption good producing ￿rms owned by house-
holds and ￿nancial intermediaries as economic agents.
In the context of the model, entrepreneurs are investment good producing
agents with low internal funds. To be able to undertake investment good
production, they rely on external ￿nancing supplied by the lenders, namely
the households. This borrowing made via ￿nancial intermediaries is typically
limited since entrepreneurs do not have enough net worth to collateralize their
debt. So lenders and entrepreneurs form a ￿nancial contract that assumes
costly state veri￿cation (CSV) which will be explained in detail in the next
subsection. Financial contract implies that higher net worth leads to higher
borrowing as a result higher investment and output. So ￿uctuations in net
worth will be an important determinant of the business cycle ￿uctuations.
The undesirability of the ￿uctuations makes room for the economic policy
options that can reduce the ￿uctuations in the net worth and output. This
paper will try to show that using ￿scal policy tools, countercyclical transfer
payments in this case, net worth ￿uctuations can be dampened. So, also
￿uctuations in investment and output will be reduced. Details of the ￿scal
policy will be explained in the further subsections.
For informative purposes the sequence of events is given the table below:
4Table 1: Sequence of Events
1. Entrepreneurs start with net worth nt at time t:
2. Productivity parameter ￿t is realized.
3. Firms choose labor and capital to produce consumption goods.
4. Firms decide how much capital to purchase from CMFs.
5. Entrepreneurs borrow from CMFs and produce capital.
6. Idiosyncratic shock !t is realized.
7. Entrepreneurs repay their contractual obligations.
8. Household owned ￿rms produce consumption goods.
9. Transfer payments are distributed/ Taxes are collected.
10. Solvent entrepreneurs and households make their consumption decisions
11. nt+1 is accumulated by entrepreneurs.
12. ￿t+1 is realized.
Since ￿t is known at the beginning of period t, there is no aggregate risk
in the economy and ￿rms choose their labor and capital demand accordingly.
To meet the demand of the ￿rms and households, entrepreneurs borrow con-
sumption goods from the CMFs and undertake capital production. With
the produced capital and supplied labor, ￿rms produce consumption goods.
After the production of the consumption goods the idiosyncratic shock !t
is realized. Since CMFs distribute loans to in￿nitely many entrepreneurs,
due to the realization of !t some entrepreneurs declare bankruptcy and some
repay their contractual obligations. Contingent on the realization of ￿t, gov-
ernment either distributes transfer payments to the entrepreneurs or levy
5taxes on them after the contractual obligations are paid by the entrepreneurs.
Finally solvent entrepreneurs and households make their consumption deci-
sions.
2.1 The Financial Contract
The ￿nancial contract consists of two parties: entrepreneurs and lenders.
Entrepreneurs have a su￿ciently small net worth nt > 0 and rely on external
￿nancing for investment good production. Lenders provide external ￿nancing
to the entrepreneurs. Both agents are risk neutral.
The entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology that transforms
it consumption goods into !tit units of capital, where !t is the idiosyncratic
shock with distribution ￿, and characterized by density ￿ and mean unity.
Agency costs are introduced to the model by assuming that the idiosyncratic
shock ! is a private information for the entrepreneur and other agents can
observe it at a cost of ￿it units of capital. This set-up is the one that is ￿rst
studied by Townsend (1979) and then by Gale and Hellwig (1985). They
show that in such a CSV framework, the optimal contract is a standard debt
contract where the borrower pays a ￿xed rate if she can and default if she
cannot in which case the lender con￿scates all the returns from the project.











is the contractual interest rate. The entrepreneur defaults if the realization !t
is less than the threshold level !t, in which case lenders monitor the outcome
and con￿scate all returns from the project. If the realized value of !t is
6higher than the threshold level, than the entrepreneur will repay the ￿xed
amount that is speci￿ed in the contract. The threshold level ! is therefore
the value which equalizes the return from the project and the amount that
















where qt is the price of capital.
The optimal contract minimizes the incidence of costly monitoring. There-
fore the ￿nancial contract should be constructed in such a way that the
entrepreneur should announce the true realization of !, because without
monitoring, the asymmetric information creates moral hazard which would
make the entrepreneur report failure of project to minimize payments. So
the optimal contract is de￿ned on (i;!), where both of the arguments are
common knowledge to all agents. The contract is made for one period, to
side step the repeated game issues of the model1.
Under the contract, the expected entrepreneurial income is given by
qtitf (!t) = qtit
￿Z 1
!
!d￿(!) ￿ ! (1 ￿ ￿(!t))
￿
, (1)
where f (!t) is the fraction of expected net capital output received by the
entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs are taxed at rate ￿t so the after tax pro￿ts of the en-
1One can refer to Gertler (1992), for a theoretical analysis of an agency cost model
with two period contracts.
7trepreneur is,





!￿(d!) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(!t))!t
￿￿
. (2)
Similarly expected income of the lender on such a contract is given by,
qtitg (!t) = qtit
"Z !
0
!d￿(!) ￿ ￿(!t)￿ + !t (1 ￿ ￿(!t))
#
; (3)
where g (!t) is the fraction of the expected net capital output received by
the lender. The taxes are paid only by the entrepreneurs.
Note that,
f (!t) + g (!t) = 1 ￿ ￿(!t)￿: (4)
So on average, ￿(!t)￿ units of capital is destroyed by monitoring.
Now, the optimal contract is given by the (i;!) pair that maximizes the
entrepreneur’s expected return subject to the lender being indi￿erent between
loaning the funds and keeping them. So, the optimal contract is given by the
solution to the following maximization problem,
max(1 ￿ ￿t)qtitf (!t) subject to qtitg (!t) ￿ (it ￿ nt): (5)
This constraint the lenders will lend their resources to the entrepreneurial
activity. The participation constraint for the entrepreneurs, (1 ￿ ￿t)qtitf (!t) ￿











1 ￿ qtg (!t)
(7)
Multiplying both sides of equation (7) by (1 ￿ ￿t)qtf (!t), we have
(1 ￿ ￿t)qtitf (!t) =
(1 ￿ ￿t)qtf (!t)




1￿qtg(!t) on nt is the expected return on internal funds
of the entrepreneur. This return must be greater than the riskless return,
(1 + r), in order to make the entrepreneur to devote all of its resources to the
investment good production. Otherwise, the entrepreneur would simply hold
on to her resources and does not undertake the investment good production.
2.2 Households and Consumption Good Producing Firms
The economy consists of a continuum of agents. The agents are of two types:
entrepreneurs (fraction 1￿￿) and household (fraction ￿). As mentioned be-
fore the entrepreneurs produce the investment good. Entrepreneurs receive
external ￿nancing needed for production from households via intermediaries,
namely the capital mutual funds (CMFs), which are assumed to be risk neu-
tral. If a household wishes to purchase capital, she must fund entrepreneurial
projects, and these projects are subject to agency costs. Furthermore, CMFs
take advantage of the law of large numbers by funding a large number of
9entrepreneurs to eliminate the idiosyncratic entrepreneurial uncertainty. So
the households earn one unit of capital with the expenditure of qt consump-
tion goods, which is implied by the riskless return of unity and they earn





, if their funds are lended to the entrepreneurs.
There are also consumer good producing ￿rms, which are not subject to the
agency costs. So we are not interested with their behavior.
Households are in￿nitely lived with the following utility function
U (ct;1 ￿ ht) = ln(ct) + ￿ (1 ￿ ht)





t (ln(ct) + ￿ (1 ￿ ht)); 0 < ￿ < 1 (9)
subject to the budget constraint
wtht + rtk
h
t + (1 + rt)bt￿1 ￿ bt + ct + qtit (10)
Here kh
t denotes the household stock of capital, ct denotes the household
consumption with its price assumed to be unity, ht is the household labor
rented to the consumer good producing ￿rms, wt labor wage, rt is the return
on capital rented to consumer good producing ￿rms, bt is the government
borrowing at the time t from the households, qt is the price of capital and it
is the investment.





[qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿) + rt+1]
￿
(11)
￿ct = wt (12)
where ￿ is the depreciation rate.
The consumption good producing ￿rms in this economy produce con-







where ￿t is the stochastic productivity factor, He
t is the aggregate supply
of entrepreneurial labor and Ht is the aggregate supply of household labor.
Competition in the factor market implies that wages and rental rates are
equal to their respective marginal products. It is important to note that
these ￿rms are not subject to agency costs.
Finally ￿t has the following stochastic dynamics:
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿ + ￿￿t￿1 + "t (14)
where "t is an i.i.d shock and ￿
￿ is the nonstochastic steady state of the
productivity factor which is equal to 1.
112.3 Entrepreneurs
Now, we will focus on the entrepreneur behavior. In this setup, the en-
trepreneurs are long-lived. Furthermore, since the return on internal funds
is greater than the riskless return, there is a possibility that they may post-
pone their consumption and accumulate enough funds to self-￿nance their
production activities.2 Introducing an additional discount factor, ￿, makes
entrepreneurs consume more than households in a given period3 and guar-
antees a nondegenerate lending equilibrium at all dates.







t; 0 < ￿ < 1; 0 < ￿ < 1 (15)
subject to the budget constraint
(1 ￿ ￿t)qtitf (!t) + xt ￿ c
e
t + qtzt+1 (16)
where, xt is the entrepreneurial wage, ce
t is the entrepreneurial consumption,
zt is the capital holdings of entrepreneur. Solving this problem yields the
following Euler equation,
qt = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿￿Et
￿
f(1 ￿ ￿)qt+1 + rt+1g
￿
qt+1f (!t+1)
1 ￿ qt+1g (!t+1)
￿￿
(17)
To raise internal funds, the entrepreneur rents his capital and labor, which
2Another reason of the possibility of fund accumulation is the linearity of the utility
function of the entrepreneur in consumption.
3Another modelling technique is to assume that the certain fraction of the en-
trepreneurs die in each period and sell their accumulated capital stock to households. The
modi￿ed version of the presented model can be found in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996).
12is inelastic, to the consumption good producing ￿rms. After time t goods
have been produced by the ￿rms and households make consumption decisions,
entrepreneurs sell their undepreciated capital to the ￿nancial intermediary for
the consumption goods in order to use them in investment good production.
Furthermore entrepreneurs receive transfer payments from government in
case of a negative (below the mean) aggregate productivity shock is realized.
After these transactions, the net worth of the entrepreneur is
nt = xt + [rt + qt (1 ￿ ￿)]zt + trt (18)
where rt is the return on capital, qt is the price of capital, zt is the en-
trepreneurial capital, xt is the entrepreneurial wage and trt is the transfer
payments received from the government at time t.
Here the entrepreneurial wage, xt, is assumed to be small but positive so
that net worth is never zero. If the net worth is zero for any time period,
then the entrepreneurs would not be able to borrow. As a result, optimal
contract problem will not be well de￿ned.
The entrepreneur uses the net worth as basis for the loan contract. Note
that, net worth does not appear in the Euler equation meaning that it holds
for all entrepreneurs either solvent or bankrupt. Using the budget constraint
we can derive the rule of motion for the entrepreneurial capital, zt:
zt+1 = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿t)f (!t)







Government raises revenue using proportional taxes levied on the pro￿ts
of the entrepreneur and borrows from the households. For simplicity, the
households are not subject to taxes. The revenues generated via taxation and
borrowing made by the government are used to distribute transfer payments
to the entrepreneurs when a negative aggregate productivity shock is realized
and to repay the debt to the households.4 Again, the purpose of this paper is
to show that countercyclical ￿scal policy rules can dampen the ￿uctuations in
the output, through reducing the ￿uctuations in net worth without making
any claims about the optimality or welfare improvement. One important
point is that the ad hoc tax rules should satisfy the intertemporal budget
constraint.













This intertemporal budget constraint implies that the present discounted




(1+r)t , should be greater or equal to the present




(1+r)t, and the repayment of
the government obligations to households, (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + r)bt￿1. One impor-
tant point to emphasize is only one period borrowing is allowed for the gov-
ernment, i.e. government should repay the debt accrued next period after the
4Note that, since entrepreneurial uncertanity is eliminated by the capital mutual funds,
only productivity shocks will have aggregate e￿ects.
14borrowing. The above intertemporal budget constraint is derived by using





t+n￿1 = 0: (21)
Now the two period budget constraint can be written as follows5:
￿tqtitf (!t) + bt = trt + (1 + r)bt￿1: (22)
The idea behind the two period budget constraint is simple. Assume
that government commits to a countercyclical policy rule such that it will
distribute transfer payments to the entrepreneurs when a negative technology
shock is realized and will not tax them until the shock returns to zero. Now
assume that a negative aggregate productivity shock is realized at date t.
Then at this period government should distribute transfer payments but do
not have resources for the distribution due to the countercyclical ￿scal rule.
So government borrows from the households and distributes them to the
entrepreneurs as transfer payments. Then in this case since tax revenues and
debt repayment, (1 + r)bt￿1, are zero and borrowing of the government will
be equal to the transfer payments, i.e. bt = trt for the period t: However,
government should repay the debt accrued at period t, next period. Since
the technology shock will be zero, government will not distribute transfer
payments but rather collect tax revenues to repay the debt. As a result,
the tax revenues collected in period t + 1 will be used to repay the debt
5In this paper, ￿ is normalized to 0:5. This normalization has no e￿ect on the dynamics
of the model or the conclusions of the paper.
15with the interest to the household, i.e. ￿t+1qt+1it+1f (!t+1) = (1 + r)bt for
t + 1. In short, government will transfer resources to the entrepreneurs by
borrowing from households at time t and chooses an appropriate tax rate to
repay the debt at t+1. Clearly this policy rule is a two period ￿scal rule that
satis￿es a two period budget constraint as well as the intertemporal budget
constraint. Furthermore, we can independently pin down the values of bt and
￿t using the budget constraint. This two period ￿scal policy rule along with
the budget constraint is useful and tractable in making inferences about the
policy options.
Since we are considering state contingent ￿scal rules, the transfer pay-
ments can be dependent on the aggregate productivity parameter, ￿, under
the implicit assumption that government can react to the aggregate produc-
tivity changes. This assumption is problematic since the aggregate productiv-
ity can be observed with a lag. So making the transfer payments contingent
to the technology shock will be more appropriate for our purposes.
2.5 Equilibrium
This subsection will present the market clearing conditions and the compet-
itive equilibrium of the model. Since there are two agents in the economy
with di￿erent capital stocks, the total capital stock in the economy is.
kt = ￿zt + (1 ￿ ￿)k
h
t (23)
16which has the rule of motion,
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + ￿it [1 ￿ ￿(!t)￿] (24)
To close the model, we need to state the equilibrium conditions. There
are four markets in the economy: a consumption goods market, a capital
goods market and two labor markets. The clearing conditions are given by,
Ht = (1 ￿ ￿)ht (25)
H
e
t = ￿ (26)
Yt = (1 ￿ ￿)ct + ￿c
e
t + ￿it + ￿￿qtitf (!t) + (1 ￿ ￿)(bt ￿ (1 + r)bt￿1) (27)
kt = ￿zt + (1 ￿ ￿)k
h
t (28)
The equations (25) and (26) are labor market clearing conditions for
households and entrepreneurs, respectively. Equation (27) is the consump-
tion goods market clearing condition and equation (28) is the capital goods
market clearing condition.
A recursive competitive equilibrium is de￿ned by decision rules for Kt+1,
Zt+1, Ht, qt, nt, it, !t, ce
t, ct, bt, ￿t where the decision rules are stationary
functions of (Kt, Zt, ￿t) and satisfy the following:




































+ qt (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
zt + trt (34)
zt+1 =
(1 ￿ ￿t)f (!t)


























(1 ￿ ￿t)qt+1f (!t+1)
1 ￿ qt+1g (!t+1)
￿￿
(36)
trt = (bt ￿ (1 + r)bt￿1) + ￿tqtitf (!) (37)
Once again, equations (29) and (30) are labor supply decision and Euler
equation for households, respectively. Equation (31) is the rule of motion for
aggregate capital. Equations (32) and (33) are optimality conditions from the
optimal ￿nancial contracting problem. Equations (34) and (35) are evolution
of net worth and entrepreneurial capital, respectively. Equation (36) is the
Euler equation for entrepreneurs and ￿nally equation (37) is the two period
government budget constraint.
183 Simulations
The parameters are calibrated to roughly match their empirical counterparts.
The table below gives the calibrated values of:
v ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(!) ￿ ￿
2:89 0:99 0:36 0:0001 0:025 0:5 0:25 0:00974 0:974 0:95
The calibrations above are consistent with Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
The constant v in the household utility function is chosen so that steady state
household labor supply, h, is 0:3. We set ￿ = 0:99 implying that steady state
return on capital is around 4 percent annually. The consumption production
technology is Cobb-Douglas with capital share of 0:36, a household labor
share of 0:6399, and an entrepreneurial labor share, ￿, of 0:0001. Note that
entrepreneurial labor share needs to be positive to ensure that entrepreneurs
earn a positive amount of wage to make net worth positive at all dates. The
depreciation rate, ￿, is set to be equal to 0:025, ￿ is set to 0:95 as usual and
￿ is just a normalization which does not alter the conclusions of the paper.
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) we set ￿ = 0:25. Now the last two
parameters, ￿ and ￿, are calculated to match bankruptcy rate given in the
above table, ￿(!), and the risk premium rate qt
￿
1 + rk￿




is the risky return to households and (1 + r) is the riskless rate.
So ￿ and ￿ are found to be 0:947 and 0:207, respectively.
Now we will compute the impulse responses for the model with agency
costs and for the model without agency costs (￿ = 0). The latter is essentially
the canonical real business cycle model. The importance of this experiment
is to be able make comparisons of the two models in terms of persistency
19and ampli￿cation of the shocks. Figure 1 below gives the impulse responses
of output, entrepreneurial consumption, household consumption and labor,
net worth, and investment to a one standard deviation negative technology
shock.
Figure 1: Impulse Responses of the Benchmark and the RBC Model
In the above ￿gure, dotted line represents impulses of the canonical real
business cycle model and solid line represents the impulses of the ￿nancial
accelerator model. The dynamics of the real business cycle model is highly
familiar. A negative aggregate productivity shock decreases the rental rate
of capital and as a result investment decreases. As investment decreases,
output and net worth falls. So both households and entrepreneurs reduce
20their consumption.6 Since ￿ = 0 for the real business cycle model, it implies
that price of capital is equal to 1, so we do not see any deviation in the price
of capital. Finally variables move to their steady state as productivity starts
picking up towards its steady state.
However, in the ￿nancial accelerator model the dynamics are quite dif-
ferent. The impulses exhibit hump-shaped responses observed in the time
series but not in the canonical real business cycle model due to the missing
internal propagation mechanism. The reason behind the hump-shapes in the
responses can be explained by the behavior of the net worth. As the neg-
ative shock hits the economy, investment falls which decreases the price of
capital. As a result, net worth and output decreases slightly with the fall
in investment. Decrease in net worth increases external ￿nance premium,
which makes borrowing costly for the entrepreneurs. Due to the limited bor-
rowing investment falls again, leading to a further decrease in net worth and
output. As a result, output exhibits hump-shapes similar to net worth and
investment.
The maximum percentage deviations of household consumption, invest-
ment, entrepreneurial consumption, net worth, price of capital and output
from their steady state values are given in the table below for the ￿nancial
accelerator model:
H. Con. Ent.Con. Inv. Net Worth P. of Cap. Output
-2.27% 76.9% -7.1% -7.06% -0.46% -1.53%
6The decline in the entrepreneurial consumption is about 2%, but since the spike in
the agency cost model is extremely high we do not see the deviation of entrepeneurial
consumption for the RBC model.
21In this model the accelerator mechanism is at work: An adverse shock to
the economy reduces the price of capital and the net worth of the ￿nancially
constrained entrepreneurs. Since the entrepreneurs cannot ￿nd enough funds
to undertake investment due to the agency costs, both investment and output
fall which leads to the further reduction of the net worth. That leads to a
persistent and ampli￿ed slowdown of economic activity. These persistent
and ampli￿ed responses are highly consistent with the time series data. This
is the reason why this class of models are attractive for the business cycle
students.
Next simulation will introduce a procyclical taxation rule with counter-
cyclical transfer payments, which reduces the net worth ￿uctuations. The
countercyclicality of the transfer payments is important since the government
will subsidize the entrepreneurs when a below the mean aggregate productiv-
ity shock is realized. Consider the transfer payment rule, which government
subsidizes the entrepreneurs by "
￿0:4
t when an adverse shock or below the
mean aggregate productivity shock, hits the economy. This rule has the im-
plicit assumption that the government can respond to the technology shocks.
It is important once again to point out that the tax rule should satisfy the
two period budget constraint. Government will borrow from the households
as much as the amount of the transfer payment in the period of the negative
productivity shock is realized and tax revenue will be zero for this period.
In the next period, government should repay the debt with interest to the
households. This repayment will be covered by the tax revenues, since the
22technology shocks are one period in length.
Figure 2 below gives the impulse responses of the benchmark ￿nancial
accelerator model without taxation and with taxation to the same negative
technology shock studied in ￿gure 1:
In the above ￿gure the solid line represents the impulses of the bench-
mark model without taxation and dotted line represents the impulses of the
benchmark model with taxation. First thing to notice is that ￿scal policy
can signi￿cantly dampen the ￿uctuations caused by the ￿nancial market fric-
tions. When the negative technology shock is realized, it a￿ects net worth
through reduction in the entrepreneurial wage and rental rate of capital.
But this initial decrease in net worth is dampened by the transfer payments
distributed by the government in the period of the shock. This dampened
23decrease in net worth also reduces the increase in the external ￿nance pre-
mium, which allows entrepreneurs to borrow more to undertake investment
good production. This relative increase in borrowing, dampens the fall in the
investment. As a result, price of capital decreases less and entrepreneurial
consumption increases less in the period of the shock. Finally output falls
less than the benchmark case. Since a negative shock is realized, tax revenue
is zero in the ￿rst period.
However in the second period, after the shock is back to zero, government
levies tax on the pro￿ts of the entrepreneurial projects in order to repay the
debt to the households, since government is allowed to borrow only for one
period. As tax revenue increases, net worth falls further since it is still
below the steady state level but above the benchmark model. As net worth
decreases further, investment decreases further but less than the benchmark
model. The further decrease of net worth and investment makes output fall
further, but still staying above the benchmark model and exhibiting a hump-
shaped response. Then economy starts pick up to the steady state levels with
tax revenue going to zero.
The maximum percentage deviations of household consumption, invest-
ment, entrepreneurial consumption, net worth, price of capital and output
from their steady state values are given in the tables below for the ￿nancial
accelerator model with taxation is as follows:
H. Cons. Ent. Cons. Inv. Net Worth P. of Cap. Output
-2.17% 18.11% -6.5% -5.01% -0.42% -1.49%
24When a procyclical taxation rule is introduced, the ￿uctuations are damp-
ened. Moreover, the hump-shaped responses of the variables are preserved
by the behavior of the net worth. A one time negative productivity shock
increases the transfer payments, since transfer payments are countercyclical.
Transfer payments distributed by the government makes net worth decrease
less and helps net worth to pick up more quickly. This reduced decrease
in net worth makes agency costs increase less relative to the benchmark
model. So the entrepreneurs can bene￿t more from the investment opportu-
nities. Eventhough decrease in rental capital decreases investment demand,
a smaller decrease in net worth, smaller increase in borrowing rates makes
entrepreneurs undertake investment projects, which dampens the decrease
in the investment demand as well as in the increase in the entrepreneurial
consumption. As a result, the price of capital and the entrepreneurial capital
decreases less. Since the ￿uctuations in the net worth and investment are
dampened, output decreases less.
Another important result of the model is about persistence of ￿uctua-
tions. Since transfer payments to entrepreneurs decreases the e￿ects of ￿-
nancial market imperfections by preventing agency costs to increase a lot, the
￿uctuations in net worth become less persistent. As a result, investment and
output reach their steady state in a shorter period of time compared to the
benchmark model. Furthermore, by reducing the ￿uctuations in net worth
and entrepreneurial consumption we can say that ￿scal policy has a positive
impact on the welfare of the entrepreneurs. By reducing the consumption
￿uctuations, welfare cost of business cycle decreases since entrepreneurs can
smooth out their consumption path.
254 Conclusions and Directions for Future Work
This paper extended a simple real business cycle model where ￿scal policy
has a role in the business cycle ￿uctuations due to the ￿nancial frictions. The
critical insight is that distributing transfer payments dampens the decrease
in net worth, which decreases the ￿uctuations in investment and output. As
a result, agency costs increase less due to the smaller fall in the net worth
and entrepreneurs can bene￿t more from the investment opportunities and
vice versa in good times. Furthermore, as the e￿ects of ￿nancial frictions
are reduced with the fall in the agency costs, the ￿uctuations become less
persistent. These results re-emphasize in the importance of economic policy
in times of ￿nancial distress. A countercyclical ￿scal policy in terms of trans-
fer payments, can reduce ￿nancial distress by making the balance sheets less
vulnerable to ￿nancial market conditions and to the adverse productivity
shock.
One important point to emphasize is that this paper did not talk about
whether the tax rule is optimal or welfare improving. If we were dealing
with lump-sum taxation, then any tax that reduces the ￿uctuations are to
be welfare improving, since the steady state is not distorted. For this model
we are dealing with a distorted steady state, which makes the answer of
the welfare question is non-trivial. The next step is, obviously, to derive
the welfare criterion for the agents and to try to ￿nd a welfare improving
tax rule, or directly solve the Ramsey problem to ￿nd the optimal taxation.
While most of the optimal taxation problems only have households as a
taxed agent, this model will need some non-trivial modi￿cations since there
26are heterogenous agents present.
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